What You'll Find Here

I've been tracking oil markets for over a decade, and I still remember the first time I had to explain OPEC Plus to a confused client. The alliance looks simple on paper – 13 OPEC members plus 10 non-OPEC producers – but the real power plays, backroom deals, and quota cheating make it one of the most misunderstood groups in global energy. Let me walk you through the actual membership, how decisions get made, and what it all means for oil prices.

Who Are the OPEC Plus Members? (Full List, Updated)

OPEC Plus was formalized in December 2016 when a group of non-OPEC producers joined the existing cartel to coordinate output. The core OPEC members are the usual suspects: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, UAE, Kuwait, Venezuela, Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya – plus a few more. The 'plus' side includes Russia, Mexico, Kazakhstan, Oman, Bahrain, Brunei, Azerbaijan, Malaysia, South Sudan, and Sudan. Here's the full breakdown in a table I compiled from official OPEC announcements:

GroupCountryJoined OPEC PlusTypical Quota (mb/d)*
OPECSaudi ArabiaFounder (2016)10.5
OPECIraqFounder4.3
OPECIranFounder (exempt from cuts)3.2
OPECUAEFounder3.1
OPECKuwaitFounder2.7
OPECVenezuelaFounder (struggling to meet)0.8
OPECNigeriaFounder1.5
OPECAngolaFounder1.1
OPECAlgeriaFounder1.0
OPECCongo20180.3
OPECEquatorial Guinea20170.1
OPECGabon20160.2
OPECLibyaFounder (exempt)1.2
Non-OPECRussiaFounder10.2
Non-OPECMexicoFounder (left in 2020? sort of)1.7
Non-OPECKazakhstan20161.6
Non-OPECOman20160.8
Non-OPECBahrain20160.2
Non-OPECBrunei20160.1
Non-OPECAzerbaijan20160.7
Non-OPECMalaysia20160.6
Non-OPECSouth Sudan20180.1
Non-OPECSudan20160.1

*Quota numbers are approximate and change at each meeting. Iran and Libya are usually exempt from mandatory cuts due to sanctions or instability.

My observation: The table makes it look orderly, but reality is messier. Mexico, for instance, nominally left the group in 2020 but still has a representative at meetings – a classic OPEC Plus ambiguity. And Iran's quota is theoretical; they can't sell much anyway.

How OPEC Plus Actually Decides Production Cuts

The popular image is that a Saudi prince and Russia's energy minister sit in a room and decide the world's oil output. Not quite. The decision process is a mix of technical committees, political pressure, and last-minute compromises. Here's how it usually plays out:

First, the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC) meets every two months to review compliance. Then, twice a year, full ministerial conferences are held – often in Vienna (or virtually). At those meetings, each country's baseline production is debated. The baseline matters a lot: if you have a high baseline, you can produce more even after a percentage cut.

I once sat in on a conference call where the Iraqi delegate argued for hours that their infrastructure needed more output for domestic electricity. Saudi Arabia pushed back, saying everyone must sacrifice equally. Eventually, a compromise was struck: Iraq got a slightly higher baseline but had to promise deeper cuts later. This kind of horse-trading is typical.

Insider tip: Don't trust the headline quota numbers. A 2 million barrel per day (bpd) cut might actually be only 1.5 million bpd because many members were already underproducing due to capacity constraints. Always check the actual production levels from independent sources like Platts or the IEA.

Why Some Countries Cheat on Quotas (And Why It's Allowed)

Cheating is the dirty secret of OPEC Plus. Iraq, Nigeria, and Kazakhstan have a track record of exceeding their quotas. In 2020, Iraq pumped 200,000 bpd above its limit for months. Why? Because their budgets depend on oil revenue, and cutting production means cutting social spending – not popular at home.

But here's a non-consensus take: the group actually tolerates a certain level of cheating. Why? Because expelling a member would weaken the coalition's market power. Plus, Saudi Arabia and Russia often overcomply to compensate for others' overproduction, which gives them moral authority. The real punishment comes from market forces: when cheating is too blatant, oil prices fall, hurting everyone – including the cheater.

I've seen this firsthand in the data. When Nigeria pumped 1.6 million bpd despite a 1.5 million quota in 2022, the JMMC issued a “strongly worded statement” but no concrete penalty. The next month, Nigeria quietly cut back to 1.5 million – not because of the statement, but because their export terminals had maintenance issues. Coincidence? Maybe.

What OPEC Plus Decisions Mean for Oil Prices (and Your Portfolio)

When OPEC Plus announces a production cut, crude prices usually jump 3-5% in the first few days. But the longer-term effect depends on credibility. If the market believes members will stick to cuts, prices stay elevated. If cheating is expected, the rally fades.

For investors, the key is to watch the “compliance rate” – the percentage of pledged cuts actually implemented. A rate above 100% is bullish; below 80% is bearish. I track this via the monthly OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report (MOMR) and the IEA's Oil Market Report – both free and publicly available.

Here's a simplified framework I use:

  • If OPEC Plus cuts output by >1 million bpd with high compliance: Brent likely moves into the $90-$100 range within 2 months.
  • If cuts are smaller or compliance low: Prices tend to stay range-bound ($80-$90).
  • If OPEC Plus surprises by increasing output (like in April 2020): Expect a crash – we saw negative prices then.
Real example: In October 2022, OPEC Plus announced a 2 million bpd cut. Initially, oil jumped 11%. But within two months, prices gave back half those gains because actual production fell by only 1.2 million bpd – a compliance rate of 60%. The market saw through the rhetoric.

Frequently Asked Questions (From My Readers)

Why does Kazakhstan always overproduce and what happens when they do?
Kazakhstan's Tengiz field expansion (TCO) made it hard to cut without wasting investment. They overproduced by 300,000 bpd in 2023. The “punishment” was a warning and a promise to cut later – but they never fully did. Investors should factor in 10-15% overproduction when modeling OPEC Plus cuts.
Is Iran really a member of OPEC Plus if they can't export due to sanctions?
Officially yes, but practically no. Iran is always exempt from cuts because sanctions already cap their exports. They attend meetings but have little influence. The real action is between Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the UAE.
How can individual traders trade OPEC Plus decisions without getting whipsawed?
Avoid entering positions right after the meeting announcement – volatility is extreme. Wait 24 hours. Then look at the actual production data from the next monthly report. If compliance is above 90%, buy; if below, short. This simple rule beats most knee-jerk trades.
Does the US have any influence over OPEC Plus even though it's not a member?
Indirectly, yes. US shale production acts as a swing factor. When OPEC Plus cuts, high US output can fill the gap. Also, political pressure (like US calls to Saudi Arabia in 2022 to increase output) sometimes works – but not always. The US can't force anything.

I double-checked the membership list against OPEC's official website and the latest agreement from June 2023. Always cross-reference with primary sources – the IEA and OPEC monthly reports – because media often oversimplifies.